Rethinking the political workings of habit and habituation, this paper suggests, is vital to understanding the logics and possibilities of social change today. Any endeavour to explore and capitalist technology. As a means to explore what it is that differentiates contemporary neoliberal modes of governing through habit from more critical approaches, this article 
In press with Body and Society (article accepted 8 th September 2017).
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T embedded in the affordable care act, financial law reform, climate change policy, and consumer protection policy (Halpern, 2015) . In the UK, nudging techniques and policies came to the fore with the conservative-B I Following in the footsteps of their American colleagues most successful policy interventions was in the area of pensions reform. While UK employers had previously, by law, required employees to opt-in to available pension s to automatically enrol workers into the program, while enabling them opt-out if they so wished. By changing the default options in this way, Halpern argues, the pension reforms mobilised the behavioural principle of endency to go along with the status quo or default removing their freedom of choice (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008: 8) . Other experiments reduce carbon emissions, increase organ donation, increase the quit rate of smoking, reduce missed medical appointments, help students finish their courses, reduce discrimination and boost Halpern, 2015: 9) . Behavioural thinking now in Britain and nudge-style policy-making expertise is (Rutter, 2015) . iv
Despite their global impact, however, nudge theory and policy are not without their significant detractors. Unsurprisingly, the paternalistic aspects of such behavioural techniques have garnered particular criticism. In the UK, for example, behavioural policies tend -demographically segment certain portions of the population as being in
4 most need of behavioural intervention (Jones et al, 2012: 51) and nudge techniques have been interpreted by some as yet another avenue for elites to police working class lifestyles and pleasures (Burgess, 2012) . More generally, the behaviour change agenda has been described as a process with potential long-term consequences, as opportunities for (Jones et al, 2012: 52) . v Critics also address the problematic relationship between behavioural economics and neoliberal capitalism, highlighting the ways in which many nudge-style policies draw heavily on corporate techniques and are largely -). From this perspective, the deployment of nudge practices to effect change at the level habitual behaviour is not neutral; rather, it reflects particular ideological commitments linked to patterns of socio-economic injustice and inequality.
For these reasons, I want to suggest, it is important to situate nudge within much longer histories of governing through habit histories which reveal the capacity for habit to be employed an exclusionary technology of social and geo-political regulation. As Tony
Bennett et al argue, in determining whether populations were capable of self-governance, nineteenth century political, medical and scientific authorities routinely discounted groups deemed Colonised populations and the domestic poor were key targets for such logic, as were, of course, women, across various locations and socio-economic classes. And yet, for those
In a similar vein, Lisa Blackman (2013) explores how pervasive liberal strategies of governmentality in the twentieth century intertwined imperialism, eugenics and the psychological sciences through a focus on discipline and habit modification. For over two centuries, then, governing through habit has functioned as a double-sided disciplinary technique: p mindless repetition , were employed to deprive whole populations of basic rights and freedoms, yet the inculcation of new rhythms and habits was simultaneously deemed essential to the improvement of their behaviour and governability. vi In press with Body and Society (article accepted 8 th September 2017).
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While Thaler and Sunstein recognise that the scope for government or corporate abuse of nudge-style behavioural techniques is, in principle, significant, they nonetheless claim that -Whether they intend to or not, governments and private institutions are always creating particular choice architectures, and thus, citizens, tax-payers, employees, consumers, drivers, smokers, potential organ donors etc. are continually being nudged in one way or another. Thus, the imperative, they insist, is not to refrain from nudging but rather to N T O behavioural interventions and outcomes -a point I return to later on.
Nudge theory, and its parent discipline of behavioural economics, however, is not the only We may desire abolition of war, industrial justice, greater equality of opportunity for all. But no amount of preaching good will or the golden rule of cultivation of sentiments of love and equity will accomplish the results. There must be a change in objective arrangements and institutions. We must work on the environment and nor merely on the hearts of men ([1922]2012: 13) .
Similarly, nudge advocates argue that behavioural change is most effectively catalysed not more subtle modifications to the choice architectures that surround us (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) from the use of speed-bumps to control dangerous driving to the adjustment of access to prescription drugs to reduce suicide rates (Halpern, 2015) . Indeed, while nudge theory emerges from from the field of cognitive design -which examines how everyday devices like thermostats or computer interfaces contribute to a kind of environmental limitation on human
10 J -15). From this perspective, transforming behaviour requires addressing 16).
Read together, these literatures make a powerful statement about the enduring relevance of habits and habituation to individual-collective change, as well as the importance of theorising social transformation from a perspective that addresses human-environment interactions and appreciates the significance of psychic, embodied and other less-than conscious forces. Yet, as I have indicated, there are important differences between nudge and pragmatist philosophy with critical implications for how we understand the wider links between habit, politics and transformation. In order to make sense of these disparities and their political and ethical significance it is necessary to trace some of the earlier scholarly initiatives and debates out of which they emerged.
Re-making habit: behaviourism and pragmatism
Philosophical analysis of habit dates back at least as far as the work of Aristotle, who Like the experimental and behavioural psychologists, the pragmatists had been greatly
C D On the Origin of Species (1859) and associated developments
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in evolutionary theory and the biological sciences. James, for instance, once described -centres, due to the presence there of systems of reflex paths, organized as to wake each other up succe ([1914] and towards analysis of empirically-observable behaviour. In doing so, he was strongly influenced by the rise of animal psychology, namely the Russian psychologist Ivan P famous study of conditioning in dogs, which was first translated into English in 1909 (Camic 1986 ). W W adjustments to their environments, in which certain stimuli produced particular responses.
Whether in rats, dogs, or children, responses that elicited productive environmental adaptations were likely to be repeated, gradually congealing into habitual modes of behaviour, whereas those that were inadequate or dangerous were likely to be avoided in the future. Crucially, the aim of behaviourism was not to understand and explain states of consciousness but rather to determine methods by which behaviour could be predicted and controlled. As I will discuss further later on, behavioural psychology was an important forerunner for the development of behavioural economics, out of which nudge theory and policy emerged.
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Seventeen years before Watson published his behavioural manifesto, Dewey had already articulated key analytical shortcomings in the emergent stimulus-response psychology. In 13 other authority figures) intervene to redirect particular stimulus-response relationships.
Whereas, from a pragmatist standpoint, transformation is an ongoing process that depends not only on efforts to alter aspects of the environments in which habits are formed, but also on on the part of subjects and collectives ([1922]2012: 15) . For instance, Dewey argues that if we want to cultivate s we need to transform educational environments, yet these interventions should be designed precisely to enable students to develop the experimental sensibility necessary to -that is, inquiry to discover the means which will (16).
That being said, for pragmatist philosophers the fact that habits are continually formed via interactions between organisms and environments means that change via habit is a process we can never master. Constituted ourselves as J we are always already part of the shifting relations in which we seek to intervene and, as -D Moreover, singular actions can have unexpected ripple effects throughout relational networks and consequently prediction of human-environmental interactions is a tenuous exercise.
Empirical observation and experimentation thus requires remaining alert to the changing dimensions of a situation as it unfolds temporally and spatially, rather than assuming that fixed trajectories can be known in advance. Fundamentally, then, if we wish to approach social change at the level of habit, Dewey argues, our efforts can only be speculative of present tendencies, rather than predictive of future outcomes.
Nudge theory and the rise of behavioural economics
Moving to the contemporary realm informed by W , which means that they are much less concerned with the role of wider socio-cultural and political structures and relations in shaping human activity than . Yet nudge approaches also draw from more recent developments in cognitive psychology which, 1950s, returned psychologists to the concept of so vehemently
14 eschewed (Sent, 2004) . Consequently, account of human behaviour is not limited to empirically observable stimulus-response reactions; it also incorporates analysis of higher mental processes such as attention, memory, perception, reasoning and decision making. The other key field informing nudge approaches is, of course, economics and, as I will discuss, it is the melding of psychology and neo-classically inspired economic theory that lends contemporary behaviour change policies and practices their distinctly neoliberal flavour.
In re-thinking of human subjectivity within economic theory, however, was never born out as it was the Chicago School, and its neoclassical economic agenda led by Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman (who would later become known as the intellectual architects of neoliberalism), that would arise as dominant in the US and internationally (Sent, 2004; Jones et al, 2012) . N C " s legacy was laying the groundwork for ongoing scholarly collaboration between psychology and economics.
By the 1970s, a new wave of behavioural economics had emerged. It was associated most closely with the work of the Israeli-born scholars Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, who drew on cognitive psychology and economic design making decisions may systematically depart from those predicted (Sent, 2004: 736) . Habitual errors occur in human decision making, they argued, because of or shortcuts we regularly rely on to make sense of complex and uncertain situations (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) . A "
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Tversky and Kahneman did not bring to fruition his earlier efforts to fundamentally reconceive the economic subject. Rather they maintained (2015) focus on how the slated into policy and practice with the help of techniques from the fields of cognitive design and social marketing.
Contemporary nudge theorists explore a range of behavioural techniques (
, to -to-, some of which aim to promote conscious reflection: for example, the presentation of government-produced nutritional advice in a manner more intuitive to the ways people tend to process information (Halpern, 2015) . Yet the majority of nudge-style interventions (like N opening example of the redesigned cafeteria) work through less-than-conscious means, re-directing habitual behaviour in ways deemed effectual precisely because they circumvent the predictable irrationalities of human decision making processes. It is in this respect that the paternalistic aspects of T " come to the fore: unlike D 
The psychic life of habits
The first key claim I wish to make is that, although nudge proponents argue that individual and social change is most effectively addressed at the level of automatic or habitual behaviour, they do not seem to appreciate just how complex and deeply rooted many habits and tendencies are. As I have discussed, pragmatist philosophers view the fact that we can modify existing habits and form new ones as central to our capacity for freedom and material transformation. However, they also acknowledge how rigid and resistant to change many forms of habituation can be. In press with Body and Society (article accepted 8 th September 2017).
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to psycho-social complexity but rather to the fact that human neural processing capabilities are limited (compared to those of machines), which means that we are frequently prone to xii For nudge theorists, decisions themselves are leaders, professional consultants) to employ nudging techniques to push people in the As long as adjustments to our everyday choice architectures are employed effectively to circumvent our often short-sighted or hassle-averse modes of habitual conduct, it is claimed, such behaviour can be easily altered or resocial problems (Halpern, 2015: 170) .
From a more critical psycho-social perspective, however, p repeat particular modes of activity psychic contours of human conduct are much more complicated than nudge theories T T " opening example of Carolyn and her re-W C well encourage some students (with the required financial resources) to select fruit or salads over chips or crisps when they purchase food at school, such techniques do nothing to acknowledge the interrelated psychic, social and economic factors that may play into cafeteria behaviour and eating habits (and related issues of malnutrition, body image and disordered eating) -from poverty, to academic pressure, to abuse and trauma, to sexism. In the UK, for instance, the school canteen has become a microcosm of class-related inequalities and their affective dynamics -from the experiences of children who receive state-financed meals being marked in the lunch q the shocking nutritional content of the catering in publically-funded schools, to research showing the huge problem of hunger, and resultant concentration deficits, among school-age children who are, for a range of reasons, not fed enough at home. As these examples begin to show, nudge techniques barely scratch the surface of the politics of school cafeterias. They also fail to address how commonly food becomes a fraught affective flashpoint for a host of unresolved psychic tensions, including issues related to power, control, protection, desire and lack xiii nor, unsurprisingly, are they interested in the relationship between eating and
In press with Body and Society (article accepted 8 th September 2017 Ultimately, nudge theorists are most persuasive when they describe the effectiveness of nudge techniques in the context of relatively non-contentious administrative and financial issues such as encouraging people to save earlier for retirement or to pay their taxes on time. Their advocacy of behavioural techniques is much less compelling when they extend it to a host of more socially fraught and complex issues, from gender inequality and racial discrimination, to teenage pregnancy and suicide. In positioning nudge theory as a universal problems (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008: 9) , its advocates can address neither the underlying structural factors at play across such a disparate range of issues, nor the differences between subjects to be nudged and their own psychological and social histories and experiences. Yet, as Dewey insists the distinctively personal or ). Although change at the level of habit is often best addressed through modifications to the wider environments in which embodied stimulation of desire and effort is one preliminary in
Grappling with the constitutive links between habit, tendency and desire would thus seem to require a critical framework equipped to negotiate complex psycho-social relations.
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All this being said, it is important to recognise that, when it was published in the 1920s, Like psychoanalysis, he suggests, it also -7). Thus, in calling for the development of a social psychology with the concept of habit at its heart, Dewey was underlining the importance of a genuinely interdisciplinary approach to theorising individual and socio-political change one that integrates psychology, biology, physiology, physics and socio-cultural analysis to make sense of, and transform, habitual conduct and relations.
Temporality, spatiality and habit assemblages
Secondly, I want to argue, nudge advocates stress the importance of re-directing habitual behaviour through modifications to the choice architectures that surround us; however, they do little to address the complexity of the ongoing interplay among bodies and environments through which habits are constituted. For Dewey, like James and contemporary thinkers such as Sullivan, habits are never static: they are continuously formed and reformed through the constitutive interaction of subjects, objects, infrastructures and environments. As Sullivan explains, the function or habit helps constitute, and possibly change, the w For example:
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A occupying space, those habits both enable and constrain the way that she might respond to the world, perhaps maintaining gendered expectations regarding shoes and locomotion and perhaps challenging or transforming them. Either way, her response helps (re)constitute the environment that then feeds back into -2015:
13).
From this perspective, individual habits are not discrete or fully separable from social, institutional or environmental patterns or tendencies; rather, they are always intimately intertwined. Instead of conceptualising individual habits in isolation (as if they were owned by discrete subjects) then, a critical approach inspired by the work of these philosophers compels us to think through the workings and implications of habit assemblages. xv Take, for example, the case of digestion as a habit assemblage: In order to illustrate the habits, Dewey compares them to psychological functions. Like processes of respiration and digestion (which require oxygen and food to function), he ([1922]2012: 10) . E D "
argues that -space of the particular nudge at hand, but the pre-and post-nudge periods are seemingly devoid of movement and activity. For example, a behavioural initiative that gives American high school girls a dollar for every day that they avoid getting pregnant may play a small role in reducing teenage pregnancy rates in a particular context (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) , but what happens after the girls leave the secondary school environment -particularly if they have received no adequate sexual education? How might their patterns of intimacy and sexual health shift or deteriorate as they inhabit new cultural and socio-economic constraints, pressures and atmospheres? xvii Relatedly, nudge advocates (similar the classical behaviourists) conceive a rather limited way: environment is, for instance, a temporary administrative framework that provides small monetary awards to school girls who avoid getting pregnant, but not the broader conditions of poverty and lack of opportunity in which teenage pregnancy often occurs. It is, moreover, the physical layout of a cafeteria but not the wider socio-political and economic structures and relations in which student eating and food purchasing practices are embedded. Indeed, within nudge theory, tweaks to choice architectures can
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re-direct human behaviour (at least temporarily), yet wider physical, socio-political, cultural and economic environments are never substantively transformed.
As such, nudge is, in many ways, a patently neoliberal endeavour. In extolling the benefits
At the end of the day, I
is on changing individual behaviour (though superficial modifications of administrative arrangements and other choice architectures)
rather than enacting deeper social or structural changes, or indeed, understanding the complex and shifting interactions among bodies, infrastructures and environments. Within amework, obesity, heart disease and teenage pregnancy are (2008: 8) . This is, by now, very familiar rhetoric in a post-Fordist, neoliberal society that promotes austerity as an ideological project and repeatedly blames individuals for structural failures xviii it is also one that resonates strongly with much older biopolitical practices of governing through habit.
It is true that Dewey, and pragmatism more generally, have been critiqued for prescribing assumptions and structural relations of power (Paringer, 1990; Sullivan, 2006) . This is an important point and one that might lead us to ask whether pragmatist philosophies of habit might be just as amenable to neoliberal political and economic aims as other approaches to habit modification. In principle, embodied technologies that work at the level of habit are equally available to all political ideologies. What is vital to highlight here, however, is that, because Dewey understands transformation as emerging through ongoing adjustments to -body-B , his analysis suggests that social change cannot plausibly or ethically be thought of exclusively (or primarily) as a project of changing the subject. This point underscores the differences between his
23 approach and dominant neoliberal technologies, which institute self-discipline and responsibility at the level of habit without attention to (or indeed precisely as a means to avoid addressing) structural conditions and frameworks. While Dewey pays careful attention to individual experience and desire, his analysis is interested precisely in how embodied subjectivities, capacities and habits are continuously refashioned through wider relational networks and assemblages. In press with Body and Society (article accepted 8 th September 2017).
Agency, neoliberalism and habits of democracy
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From this perspective, nudge approaches may actually be more pernicious than previous neoliberal forms of governance. Typical neoliberal technologies of the 1990s and early 2000s were designed to compel us to develop certain cognitive, psychic and embodied capacities and skills so that we could play a full role as responsible, self-regulating, entrepreneurial citizens in a capitalist economy. Cultivating such self-sufficient neoliberal subjects functioned, of course, to fuel market logics, while enabling a shrunken state and culled back social and health services. However, the possibility at least existed for subjects to re-appropriate such competencies and employ them against the grain of neoliberalism in ways that might furnish alternative personal and political goals and agendas. xx Indeed, while docility, as theorised by Michel Foucault ([1975 ]1995 , enables a reconfiguration of embodied conduct to make individuals amenable to governance, it also endows subjects the power to shape their own bodily movements and capacities in ways that can exceed these disciplinary aims. In a similar vein, Dewey argues that, although identified power to re-make old habits, to reFrom this perspective, it does not make sense to figure as eternally opposed ([1922]: 2012: 41) .
By contrast, nudge is not particularly interested in (or indeed capable of) harnessing embodied plasticity to build flexible and enduring capacities or skills. As I have discussed, nudge techniques work in the specific context they are designed for but are not generally equipped to extend to new or different settings. F --ay be successful in encouraging more people to pay into a recommended pension plan than would have otherwise, but it does not address wider financial or savings habits outside this specific administrative configuration. As such, nudges do not promote the embodied and cognitive repetition usually required to cultivate enduring new habits. Given that nudges often operate below the level of direct consciousness, they also do not invite the kind of critical reflection that might enable subjects to hone capacities and techniques that resonate with their own experiences, goals and desires. Indeed, as Thaler explains, nudge was envisioned as an attractive approach to anyone to do anything (italics, mine, 2015: ix-x) . Moreover, and crucially,
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as nudge techniques themselves are generally the purview of authorities and experts (or delegated technologies), people do not have a say in the kinds of nudges to which they are subjected. xxi Consequently, nudge approaches offer less of a platform for Foucaultian than they do a post-neoliberal technology of paternalistic control. xxii
The kind of behavioural change that government and corporate nudge-style interventions deliver is therefore both limited and antithetical to genuine democratic citizenship and participation.
Pragmatist philosophies of habit offer quite a different framework for thinking through the subjective and political possibilities of transforming embodied habits and tendencies. From In press with Body and Society (article accepted 8 th September 2017).
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As such, it is only by inhabiting our ongoing sensorial experience in the present 82). Indeed, it is precisely this empirical and speculative capacity that Dewey lifelong education and participatory democracy sought to cultivate. Furthermore, and importantly, attending to the quality and variation of experience as it happens enables us to hone our attunement to alternative possibilities in the making to the potential for human and socio-political habits and tendencies to become otherwise.
Conclusions
Contributing to growing critical and interdisciplinary work on habituation, this article has argued that rethinking the concept of habit is fundamental to making sense of the contemporary logics and possibilities of social transformation. Rather than focusing on the dissolution of pernicious habits, I have suggested, we might more fruitfully explore how existing forms of habituation can be opened up to alternative material, ethical and political possibilities. Though, as pragmatist philosophers such as Dewey make clear (contra nudge
advance. Yet, t [1922] 2012: 82), we may be tendencies. As my comparison of nudge theory and philosophies of habit has illustrated, however, this cannot be a project of individual subjects alone given the ways in which habits are formed and reformed through the interactions of minds, bodies and environments, we need J complex and shifting sets of relations, however, requires further critical thought and speculative experimentation.
Engaging politically with the repression and ambivalence central to our most pervasive (and invisible) psychic and embodied habits would seem to require a pragmatism informed by critical psycho-social theories and practices. At the same time, approaching human
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subjectivities as contingent components of mind-body-environmental assemblages calls for techniques that appreciate the imbrication of embodied beings with diverse geographies, architectures and infrastructures, including economics and digital ones (Pedwell, 2017a, b) .
Within such a framework, it is processual relations, interactions and intensities that are the focus, displacing the comparatively bounded organism of behavioural approaches. While this kind of interdisciplinary approach demands specialist knowledge and expertise, an affirmative and inclusive praxis of habit cannot remain the exclusive purview of experts and ' nking, sensing and experimenting through habit must become a shared endeavour, engaged in by diverse collectives across multiple interconnected fronts of social, political, ethical and environmental salience. From this perspective, the potential exists for critical engagement with habit to furnish more affirmative individualdefined not as neoliberal disciplining of self-conduct in line with normative politicoeconomic imperatives, but rather as an ongoing proces
D
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